2. iDDIA: ATAT�RK CASUS iDi ?

G i r i s

�ns�z

Asagidaki ciddi iddialari; Atat�rk�� koruma kanunlari ile yasaklama ve cezalandirma hicbir fayda getirmemistir. Bilakis bu suclamalar git-gide daha da artmis ve hatta bu kanunlar aksi tesirlerini de g�stermeye baslamislardir. Atat�rk�e karsi bir kinin varligindan da bahsetmek gercek disi da olmasa gerek. Bu demektir ki, bu yasaklama kanunlarinin derhal ortadan kaldirilmalari gerekir. Atat�rk�� koruma kanunlari adi altindaki kanunlar, cag disi kanunlardir ve hicbir kimse veya kurulus icin d�nya tarihinde b�yle bir sacma kanun yoktur. Hem Atat�rk��n bu gibi koruma kanunlarina da ihtiyaci yoktur. Hem yasaklarla ve cezalarla bir insan savunulamaz.
Cumhuriyetle ilgili olmayan bu saldirilarin sadece Atat�rk�e y�neltilmis oldugu da kesindir. Atat�rk�e yapilan bu saldirilarin, Cumhuriyete yapilan saldirilar olarak g�sterilmeleri de yanlistir.
Saldirilari ve bunlara verilen cevaplari ham olarak toplayip, sizlere sunmayi dogru buluyorum.
Bu arada Atat�rk�� savunma bilinc ve materyallerinden yoksun olan Atat�rkc�lerin terbiyesizce k�f�rlere bas vurduklarini tespit etmek beni de �zd�.
Eger Atat�rk�� savunabilecek bilgi ve yeteneginiz yoksa, k�f�rlere basvurarak, "Atat�rkc�ler cahil insanlardir" �n yargisinin olusmasini da desteklemeyiniz.


MiM

iddialar

iDDIA: ATAT�RK BiR iNGiLiZ CASUSU iDi ?
May 12

M Kemal'in ingiliz ajani olduguna dair deliller...

* * Mustafa Kemal'in ingiliz ajani olduguna dair m�him deliller... Dikkatle okuyunuz

(Umarim ingilizce biliyorsunuzdur, bilmiyorsaniz l�tfen yorum yapmayiniz...)

Ataturk, The Rebirth of a Nation,
Lord Kinross, 1965, sayfa: 141-142

In the large room on the first floor of his house in Shishli the three friends talked and plotted to find a way out for their country. They formed in effect a secret revolutionary committee, whose aim was to force the resignation of the Government, to form a new one, if necessary to dethrone the Sultan. But one at least of their conferedates found Kemal too extreme. He feared the risk involved and the committee was disbanded. Maybe, after all, revolution was not the answer, for any attempt at it would immediately be suppressed by the Allies.

Perhaps, it occurred to Kemal, something could be achieved through the Allies themselves. With his compelling presence and his immaculate uniform, emblazoned with medals and with the insignia of an ADC to the Sultan, he was already a conspicuous figure in the Pera Palace Hotel, its mock-Oriental marble halls now teeming with officers in the occupying forces and in the Inter-Allied High Commission. He attracted their curiosity as soon as it became known that he was the hero of the Dardanelles. At first he chose to keep his distance.

But now he began to see that some contact with the Allies might serve his designs. They were, after all, in virtual control of the country. The French had landed in Alexandretta and were pressing forward into Cilicia. The Italians were about to land at Adalia, thence likewise to penetrate inland. The British had control officers scattered over Turkey from Thrace to the Caucasus, supervising demobilization and disarmament. The Sultan was in power, and unlikely to give Kemal a post of any consequence in the dwindling Turkish army. For what he sought -and this was just such a national resurgence as Curzon feared- any position of authority was better than none. Might he not obtain some post from the Allies themselves - preferably the British, who had no ultimate territorial designs on the country? Power obtained under their auspices, now that they had come, might well be turned into other and more patriotic channels once they had gone.

Deciding to sound them out indirectly, he chose as intermediary a British correspondent of repute, G. Ward Price, of the 'Daily Mail'. Through the manager of the Pera Palace Hotel, he sent the correspondent an invitation to take coffee with him. After consulting the responsible colonel in the Intelligence Branch of the General Staff, Mr Ward Price accepted. He found Kemal not in uniform but in a frock-coat and fez. He struck him as handsome and virile, restrained in gestures, quiet and deliberate in voice. He was accompanied by his friend Refet.

Kemal confessed to him that his country had joined the wrong side in the war. The Turks should never have quarrelled with the British. They had done so as a result of Enver's pressure. They had lost - and now they must pay heavily. Anatolia was to be divided. Kemal was anxious that the French should be kept out of the country. A British administration would be less unpopular.

'If the British,' he said, 'are going to assume the responsibility for Anatolia, they will need the co-operation of experienced Turkish governors to work under them. What I want to know is the proper quarter to which I can offer my services in that capacity.'

Ward Price gave the staff colonel an account of the interview. He dismissed it as unimportant, remarking, 'There will be a lot of these Turkish generals looking for jobs before long.'

*****

Istiklal Harbimizin Esaslari,
Kazim Karabekir, Timaþ Yayinlari, 1991, sayfa: 238-239

Harekete gecelim, gecmeyiniz m�nakasasi b�y�k bir dosya teskil eder. Bunlarin en m�himi 12/Nisan tarihli Mustafa Kemal Pasa'nin Sifresinin 2. ve 3. maddelerinde g�r�l�r: (dikkatle okuyunuz lutfen)

" 2- Ermenistan'a taarruz hareketimizi Itilaf devletleri ve Amerika harp ilaný kabul edecek ve ihtimal ki memleketin Bati kisimlarindan ve b�y�k bir ihtimalle Trabzon'dan taarruza gececeklerdir. " ve 3. maddesi: " 3- Trabzon'a terk olunacak kuvvetin bir Ingiliz cikartmasina mukabele ve m�dafaa edememesi halinde b�t�n memleket dahilindeki teredd�d�n aleyhimize gelismesi akla geliyor. " m�talaalaridir.

Benim elimde Kolordu nami altinda eski 9. Ordunun iki Kolorduluk kuvveti vardi. Plan geregi bana daha iki Kolordu verilecek iken en yakin biri dahi verilmiyordu. Ben de itiraz etmiyordum, çünkü G�rc� Ordusunu Bolsevikler tuttugundan bana esit olan Ermeni Ordusunu birkac taarruzla harp dýþý edebilecegime kanaatim vardi. Bunu defalarca Mustafa Kemal Pasa'ya da anlatmitim. Ermeni ve G�rc� Ordulari Ingilizlerle de takviye edilmis bir halde iken kýþýn bile Kafkasya'ya taarruzu isteyen Mustafa Kemal Pasa'nin simdi önüme bir takim mahzurlar ymasnin sebebini anlamistim: O, Rawlinson'un bana yapti ve benim de Hey'et-i Temsiliye'ye bildirerek sakinilmasini istedigim Ingiliz'in, " Cumhuriyet teskil ederseniz yardim ederiz " vaadine inanarak B�y�k Millet Meclisi Baskanliginda Ankara'da kalip ic siyasi cepheden hal edecegini saniyordu.

Ibrahim
May 11.05
**********

ATAT�RK CASUSMUYDU ?

yahudi M.Kemal bir Ingiliz ajanidir
Jan 11

M Kemal'in ingiliz ajani olduguna dair(devami)

(Daha �nce de s�yledigim gibi: ingilizce bilmiyorsaniz l�tfen yorum yapmayiniz...)

The Sunday Times (London),
February 11, 1968, sayfa: 8

DIPLOMATIC HISTORY
------------------
Martin Gilbert

HOW OUR MAN DECLINED TO RULE TURKEY (Dikkat edin, ingiliz gazete m. kemal'den "adamimiz" diye s�z ediyor)

In November 1938 Kemal Ataturk, President of Turkey, lay dying. During the 15 years of his stern dictatorship, he had dragged a reluctant Turkey forcibly into the 20th century. He had outlawed the fez and the veil. He had broken the powers of Islam. He had introduced the Latin alphabet.

Now, on his deathbed, Ataturk feared it would be impossible to find a successor able to continue his work. He summoned Sir Percy Loraine, the British Ambassador, to the presidential palace in Istanbul. What passed between them has remained secret for nearly 30 years. It is revealed for the first time by Piers Dixon, in his life of his father, Sir Pierson Dixon ("Double Diploma," to be published by Hutchinson this week). Among Pierson Dixon's papers was a telegram from Percy Loraine to the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax. In what is surely one of the strangest of all documents of recent British history, Loraine recounts his bizarre interview with the dying dictator:

" On my arrival . . . I found His Excellency propped up by pillows with two doctors and two nurses in attendance. . . . On my entry the President dismissed the doctors and the nurses, telling them curtly that he would ring if he required anything . . .

His Excellency then spoke to me slowly but carefully. He said that he had sent for me because, while he wished in no way to place me in an unfair position, he had an urgent request to make of me to which he hoped I would return a straight reply.

I would, no doubt recall the many interviews that I had had with him in the past. This might well be the last. In the course of a long and adventurous career, he had made and lost many friends and had taken and discarded much advice. My friendship and my advice was the one which he valued most because it had been the most consistent. It was for this reason that on various occasions . . . he had consulted me as freely as though I had been a Turkish Cabinet Minister myself.

It was his prerogative as President of the Republic to nominate a successor before his demise. His most earnest wish was that I should succeed him as President, and for this reason he wished to know what my reactions would be to this proposal.

After some minutes of silent reaction I told His Excellency in reply that I was quite unable to formulate any words which adequately expressed my feelings. Indeed, I was at that moment more deeply moved than I could ever remember being at any other time in my career.

By his proposal His Excelleny had paid a unique compliment not only to me personally but also to the foreign policy of His Majesty's Government. . . . His Excellency would realise that I had spent the greater part of my life in the service of H M [His Majesty's, HD]. . . . I hoped that I might have many years of such service still in front of me. His Excellency had asked for a straight answer and I would give him that answer. I gravely doubted whether my best qualities lay in the administrative sphere. The responsibilities of a President of the Turkish Republic were vastly different from those of a British Ambassador and I felt that my abilities and experience were best employed by continuing in the latter capacity. . . . I must therefore regretfully but firmly decline.

When I had finished speaking the President showed signs of great emotion. He sank back on the pillows and rang for his nurses, who administered a restorative.

When he was able to speak again His Excellency informed me he fully understood the reasons which had influenced my decison; he was good enough to say that, though bitterly disappointed, it was in a sense the reply he would have expected from me. He would therefore nominate Ismet Inonu in my place.

Ataturk then raised himself on his elbows and grasped my hand. He thanked me for what I had done for the furtherance of Anglo-Turkish friendship and then sank back in an unconscious state. I accordingly deemed it best to withdraw.

I shall be most grateful if I can receive from your Lordship a message of approval of the action which I have taken.

Please inform the King. "

*****

Double Diploma: The Life of Sir Pierson Dixon, Don and Diplomat
by Piers Dixon, 1968, Hutchinson of London, sayfa: 42-44.

Epilogue
Dixon's papers contain a curious account - a telegram from Loraine apparently to Halifax - describing events in Turkey nine months later.

10th November 1938
Yesterday evening I was summoned to go down to Istanbul to the President's bedside. Though I was in the middle of dinner when the message was received I naturally obeyed the summons immediately and left just in time to catch the night train.

On my arrival this morning at the Dolmabagce Palace I found His Excellency propped up by pillows with two doctors and two nurses in attendance. He looked altogether stronger than might have been expected, although his lungs and his kidneys were evidently causing him considerable discomfort. On my entry the President dismissed the doctors and the nurses, telling them curtly that he would ring if he required anything.

After they had withdrawn His Excellency then spoke to me slowly but carefully. He said that he had sent for me because, while he wished in no way to place me in an unfair position, he had an urgent request to make of me to which he hoped I would return a straight reply, I would no doubt recall the many interviews that I had had with him in the past. This might well be the last. In the course of a long and adventurous career, he had made and lost many friends and had taken and discarded much advice. My friendship and my advice was the one which he valued most because it had been the most consistent. It was for this reason that on various occasions, notably over the Alexandretta dispute, he had consulted me as freely as though I had been a Turkish Cabinet Minister myself. It was his prerogative as President of the Republic to nominate a successor before his demise. His most earnest wish was that I should succeed him as President, and for this reason he wished to know what my reactions would be to this proposal.

After some minutes of silent reaction I told His Excellency in reply that I was quite unable to formulate any words which adequately expressed my feelings. Indeed, I was at that moment more deeply moved than I could ever remember being at any other time in my career. By his proposal His Excelleny had paid a unique compliment not only to me personally, but also to the foreign policy of His Majesty's Government, which I had always endeavoured faithfully to interpret and to further in my capacity as His Majesty's Representative in Turkey. His Excellency would realise that I had spent the greater part of my life in the service of His Majesty's Government, not, I thought, altogether unsuccessfully. I reminded him that when I had been in England in the summer Your Lordship had been most generous in addressing some kind words of appreciation to me in regard to the manner in which I had executed the policy of His Majesty's Government in His Excellency's country. I hoped that I might have many years of such service still in front of me. His Excellency had asked for a straight answer, and I would give him that answer. I gravely doubted whether my best qualities lay in the administrative sphere. The responsibilities of a President of the Turkish Republic were vastly different from those of a British Ambassador and I felt that my abilities and experience were best employed by continuing in the latter capacity.

My duties in this respect were primarily towards my own country, a point of view which so strong a patriot as himself would be the first to appreciate. Were I to accept the suggestion that he should nominate me as his successor, it would create a most dangerous precedent... I must therefore regretfully but firmly decline.

When I had finished speaking the President showed signs of great emotion. He sank back on the pillows and rang for his nurses, who administered a restorative. When he was able to speak again, His Excellency informed me that he fully understood the reasons which had influenced my decison; he was good enough to say that, though bitterly disappointed, it was in a sense the reply which he would have expected from me. He would therefore nominate Ismet Inonu in my place.

Ataturk then raised himself on his elbows and grasped my hand. He thanked me for what I had done for the furtherance of Anglo-Turkish friendship and then sank back again in an unconscious state. I accordingly deemed it best to withdraw.

I have ventured to send this brief account to Your Lordship because what passed between Mustapha Kemal and myself as described in this telegram is, so far as I am aware, unique in the annals of British diplomacy. I desire to place on record my appreciation of this great compliment that has been paid to me.

I shall be most grateful if I can receive from Your Lordship a message of approval of the action which I have taken.

Please inform the King

yahudi M.Kemal bir Ingiliz ajanýdýr
Jan 11.05

M Kemal'in ingiliz ajani olduguna dair deliller...

* * Mustafa Kemal'in ingiliz ajani olduguna dair m�him deliller... Dikkatle okuyunuz

(Umarim ingilizce biliyorsunuzdur, bilmiyorsaniz l�tfen yorum yapmayiniz...)

Ataturk, The Rebirth of a Nation,
Lord Kinross, 1965, sayfa: 141-142

In the large room on the first floor of his house in Shishli the three friends talked and plotted to find a way out for their country. They formed in effect a secret revolutionary committee, whose aim was to force the resignation of the Government, to form a new one, if necessary to dethrone the Sultan. But one at least of their conferedates found Kemal too extreme. He feared the risk involved and the committee was disbanded. Maybe, after all, revolution was not the answer, for any attempt at it would immediately be suppressed by the Allies.

Perhaps, it occurred to Kemal, something could be achieved through the Allies themselves. With his compelling presence and his immaculate uniform, emblazoned with medals and with the insignia of an ADC to the Sultan, he was already a conspicuous figure in the Pera Palace Hotel, its mock-Oriental marble halls now teeming with officers in the occupying forces and in the Inter-Allied High Commission. He attracted their curiosity as soon as it became known that he was the hero of the Dardanelles. At first he chose to keep his distance.

But now he began to see that some contact with the Allies might serve his designs. They were, after all, in virtual control of the country. The French had landed in Alexandretta and were pressing forward into Cilicia. The Italians were about to land at Adalia, thence likewise to penetrate inland. The British had control officers scattered over Turkey from Thrace to the Caucasus, supervising demobilization and disarmament. The Sultan was in power, and unlikely to give Kemal a post of any consequence in the dwindling Turkish army. For what he sought -and this was just such a national resurgence as Curzon feared- any position of authority was better than none. Might he not obtain some post from the Allies themselves - preferably the British, who had no ultimate territorial designs on the country? Power obtained under their auspices, now that they had come, might well be turned into other and more patriotic channels once they had gone.

Deciding to sound them out indirectly, he chose as intermediary a British correspondent of repute, G. Ward Price, of the 'Daily Mail'. Through the manager of the Pera Palace Hotel, he sent the correspondent an invitation to take coffee with him. After consulting the responsible colonel in the Intelligence Branch of the General Staff, Mr Ward Price accepted. He found Kemal not in uniform but in a frock-coat and fez. He struck him as handsome and virile, restrained in gestures, quiet and deliberate in voice. He was accompanied by his friend Refet.

Kemal confessed to him that his country had joined the wrong side in the war. The Turks should never have quarrelled with the British. They had done so as a result of Enver's pressure. They had lost - and now they must pay heavily. Anatolia was to be divided. Kemal was anxious that the French should be kept out of the country. A British administration would be less unpopular.

'If the British,' he said, 'are going to assume the responsibility for Anatolia, they will need the co-operation of experienced Turkish governors to work under them. What I want to know is the proper quarter to which I can offer my services in that capacity.'

Ward Price gave the staff colonel an account of the interview. He dismissed it as unimportant, remarking, 'There will be a lot of these Turkish generals looking for jobs before long.'


Istiklal Harbimizin Esaslarý,
Kazým Karabekir, Timaþ Yayinlari, 1991, sayfa: 238-239

Harekete gecelim, gecmeyiniz m�nakaas byik bir dosya teskil eder. Bunlarin en m�himi 12/Nisan tarihli Mustafa Kemal Pasa'nin Sifresinin 2. ve 3. maddelerinde g�r�l�r: (dikkatle okuyunuz lutfen)

" 2- Ermenistan'a taarruz hareketimizi Itilaf devletleri ve Amerika harp ilani kabul edecek ve ihtimal ki memleketin Bati kisimlarindan ve b�y�k bir ihtimalle Trabzon'dan taarruza gececeklerdir. " ve 3. maddesi: " 3- Trabzon'a terk olunacak kuvvetin bir Ingiliz Cikartmasina mukabele ve m�dafaa edememesi halinde b�t�n memleket dahilindeki teredd�d�n aleyhimize gelismesi akla geliyor. " m�talaalaridir.

Benim elimde Kolordu nami altinda eski 9. Ordunun iki Kolorduluk kuvveti vardi. Plan geregi bana daha iki Kolordu verilecek iken en yakýn biri dahi verilmiyordu. Ben de itiraz etmiyordum, çünkü G�rc� Ordusunu Bolsevikler tuttugundan bana esit olan Ermeni Ordusunu birkac taarruzla harp disi edebilecegime kanaatim vardi. Bunu defalarca Mustafa Kemal Pasa'ya da anlatmistim. Ermeni ve G�rc� Ordulari Ingilizlerle de takviye edilmis bir halde iken kýþýn bile Kafkasya'ya taarruzu isteyen Mustafa Kemal Pasa'nin simdi önüme bir takim mahzurlar ymasnn sebebini anlamistim: O, Rawlinson'un bana yaptigi ve benim de Hey'et-i Temsiliye'ye bildirerek sakinilmasini istedigim Ingiliz'in, " Cumhuriyet teskil ederseniz yardim ederiz " vaadine inanarak B�y�k Millet Meclisi Baskanliginda Ankara'da kalip isi siyasi cepheden hal edecegini saniyordu.

yahudi M.Kemal bir Ingiliz ajanidir
Jan 11.05

Asagidaki yazinin eksik kismi...

** Asagida Ahmet Kabakli�nin yorumu nedense cikmamis, onu tekrar as yorum buraya... Bu yazilari birkac defa dikkatlice okuyun...

"Bati'ya kalkan tren" hizini almisti.

"Hilafet'in kaldirilmasina dýþtan ve içten akisler" derleyen Ahmet Kabakli, T�rk Edebiyati'nin Nisan sayisinda bu konuya oldukca genis yer ayiriyor. Ikbal gibi Islam sairleri o zaman Mustafa Kemal'i "M�cahid-i Islam" olarak selamliyordu. Sonra "Eyvah" i yazacakti ama olan olacakti bu arada.

Kabakli'nin bu derlemesini �zet olarak buraya aktariyorum:

" T�rklerin hilafeti ansizuin ve beklenmeyen bir tarzda kaldirmalari basta Ingilizler olmak �zere b�t�n Bati'dan alkýþ toplamistir. Bu bakimdan Mustafa Kemal Pasa' ya y�neltilen pek cok �vg�ler arasinda General Sheiril Mustafa Kemal Pasa'yi ünlü Protestan reformcu Martin Luther'e benzetmektedir. "

Ingiliz yazari Ph. Gravet "Saltanat ve Hilafet'in kaldirilmasini T�rkiye'yi bir Avrupa devleti haline getirmek isteyen devrimci degisikliklerin ilki" olarak yorumluyor.

Hind m�sl�manlari ve Avrupa m�sl�manlari Hilafetin kaldirilmasi karsisinda hayal kirikliklarini ifade ederlerken "Briton and Turk, London 1941"de þu görüþler yer almaktaydi: "Türk Cumhuriyetcileri, m�sl�man uyruklari olan herhangi bir gayrim�slim devlet isin (Ingiltere gibi) her zaman g�cçl�kler cikartacak bir kurumu (Hilafeti) ortadan kaldirmakla Britanya Imparatorlugu'na olaganst� bir iyilik yapmistir."


Posted By: yahudi M.Kemal bir Ingiliz ajanidir
Jan 10.05

M�sl�man T�rk milletine oynanan en b�y�k oyun...

British Foreign Minister (1924, March 3rd) :
"We must put an end to anything which brings about any Islamic unity between the sons of Muslims. As we have succeeded in finishing off the Khilafah so we must ensure that there will never arise unity for the Muslims whether it be intellectual or cultural unity."

-The Islamic State, Taqiuddin An-Nabbahani, Al-Khilafah Publications-